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Which Came First the Parent or the Child?
Abstract
From the moment a child is born, she is a juridical person endowed with constitutional rights. A child’s
parents, however, do not become legal parents until a state statute grants them the fundamental right to raise
one’s child. The state, therefore, exercises considerable power and discretion when it drafts the parentage
statutes that determine who becomes a legal parent. This article asserts that the state, through its parens
patriae power, has a duty to act as an agent for children when it drafts its parentage statutes. In particular, the
state must adopt parentage statutes that satisfy children’s fundamental right to legal parents at birth. This right
derives from the Substantive Due Process privacy right to form intimate, familial relationships, as well as the
right to intimate association and ensures that a child may develop the parent-child relationships necessary to
preserve her liberty, protect her rights, and define her identity.
To guarantee children’s fundamental right to legal parents at birth, states must reform their current parentage
statutes. This article argues that states must first replace all presumptions in parentage statutes with clear
determinations of legal parentage at birth. Next, states must grant legal parentage of children conceived
through sexual reproduction to the child’s genetic parents. For children conceived through assisted
reproductive technology, states must grant legal parentage to the intended parents. By adopting statutes that
assign children parents from these respective groups, states ensure that the persons who are most likely to act
in the child’s best interest become the child’s legal parents. In so doing, the state fulfills its parens patriae
obligation to guarantee every child’s fundamental right to legal parents at birth.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Which came first, the chicken or the egg? For centuries people
have debated this question, which, although simple, raises complex
issues of how life began. It cannot be that the chicken came first, as
a chicken comes from an egg. Yet, it cannot be that the egg came
first, because an egg comes from a chicken.
Which came first, the parent or the child? At first glance, this
question appears to present an inquiry as unanswerable as the
chicken-and-egg conundrum. Under the law, however, this question
does not require philosophical or theological interpretation. Instead,
it has a clear legal answer: the child comes first, and legal parents
come second.
While it may seem surprising that, under the law, the child
comes first and the parent comes second, this reality is commonly
accepted. Consider, for instance, the dictionary definitions of "child"
and "parent." The definition of child is the same whether you consult
a common English dictionary or a legal dictionary.' The definition of
"parent," however, varies. For example, according to Merriam-
Webster, a parent is "one that begets or brings forth offspring" or "a
person who brings up and cares for another."2 In contrast, Black's
Law Dictionary defines "parent" as "[tihe lawful father or mother of
someone."3 Therefore, although we commonly understand a "parent"
1. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 214 (11th ed. 2003)
(defining child as "a person not yet of age" or "a son or daughter of human parents");
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 271 (9th ed. 2009) (defining child as "[a] person under the
age of majority" or "[a] son or daughter").
2. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 214 (11th ed. 2003).
3. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 271 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added). Furthermore,
according to Black's Law Dictionary, "a person ceases to be a legal parent if that
306 [Vol. 62:2
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to be someone who "begets offspring" or "cares for another," a person
is not a "parent" in the legal sense until she is determined to be by
the law.4 Under the law, the child comes first and the parent comes
second.
A closer look at state parentage statutes further demonstrates
that legal parents do not exist until after a child is born. In all fifty
states, the child is a juridical person with constitutional rights at the
moment of birth. Exactly who will be the child's legal parents,
however, depends on the applicable state statute.5 For example,
consider a child born to a gestational carrier.6 Regardless of whether
that child is born in Illinois, Michigan, or Minnesota, the moment she
is born, she is a legal person endowed with constitutional rights that
do not vary based on the state of her birth. Who the legal mother is,
however, varies widely depending on geography. If the child is born
in Illinois, the applicable state statute would make the intended
mother the legal mother of the child.7 If the child is born in
Michigan, however, the gestational carrier would be the child's legal
mother according to state statute.8 In Minnesota, due to the absence
of a state statute dealing with surrogacy, a court ruling is likely
necessary to determine legal parentage.9 Therefore, although we
person's status as a parent has been terminated in a legal proceeding." Id.
4. James G. Dwyer, The Child Protection Pretense: States' Continued
Consignment of Newborn Babies to Unfit Parents, 93 MINN. L. REV. 407, 411 (2008)
[hereinafter Dwyer, Child Protection] (noting that "[a] parent-child relationship is a
legal relationship" that creates "an opportunity for a social relationship to arise"); June
Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Ties Bind? Redefining the Parent-Child Relationship
in an Age of Genetic Certainty, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1011, 1015 (2003)
("Discussions of parentage often assume an answer, and when they do, they most often
assume that the word 'parent' refers to a child's biological progenitors. The law is
more varied and complex. The definition of legal parent varies not only over time and
culture but also by jurisdiction.").
5. Throughout this Article, we use the term "parents" rather than "parent." By
doing so, we do not assert that every child must have two legal parents. In fact, our
argument is that the fundamental right to legal parents at birth requires the State to
provide at least one legal parent for every child. Our use of "parents" merely simplifies
the text and reflects the fact that two parents are currently considered the norm in
child rearing.
6. A gestational carrier is "[a] woman who carries out the gestational function
and gives birth to a child for another ... and who relinquishes any parental rights she
may have upon the birth of the child." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1106 (9th ed. 2009).
7. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/15 (2010) (stating that in cases of gestational
surrogacy, the intended parents shall be the legal parents).
8. See MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 722.855 (2010) (stating that surrogacy contracts shall
be void as a matter of public policy). However, if a custody dispute arises between the
surrogate and the biological parents, the court will decide who the legal parents are by
considering the child's best interests. Id. § 722.861.
9. The only statute in Minnesota regarding assisted reproductivre technology
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may never agree on whether the chicken or the egg came first, in
every state, the child comes first and the state decides who the legal
parents are second.10
Recognition of this sequence of events - the time when a child
exists, but legal parents do not - reveals the awesome power which
states wield in defining legal parentage and requires the rethinking
of family law, and parentage statutes in particular. If different
people would become legal parents depending on the state where a
child is born, we can no longer view parentage statutes as
recognizing an inherent relationship between an adult and a child, or
as a means of guaranteeing an adult's pre-existing constitutional
right to raise a child. Instead, because the child comes first and the
legal parents come second, we contend that parentage statutes must
be written with the child's needs and rights in mind. More
specifically, we argue that parentage statutes must guarantee a
child's fundamental right to legal parents at birth.
In Part II, this Article reviews the key Supreme Court decisions
regarding the constitutional rights of children. These cases
demonstrate that children are juridical persons and have
constitutional rights from the moment of birth. Part III discusses the
fundamental right to raise one's child. Relying on Supreme Court
addresses artificial insemination. See MINN. STAT. § 257.56 (2010) (stating that the
husband of a woman who is artificially inseminated with another man's sperm is the
child's legal father). Minnesota has one unpublished opinion regarding surrogacy. In
that case, the court upheld the surrogacy contract. In re Paternity & Custody of Baby
Boy A., No. A07-452, 2007 WL 4304448, at *9 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2007).
Specifically, the court found the gestational-surrogacy agreement was a valid contract
and not contrary to public policy. Id. at *5-7.
10. Determination of paternity is also affected by the applicable state's law. For
example, if a married woman gives birth to a child that is not her husband's, whether
the genetic father will be the legal father depends on the state in which the child is
born. In Minnesota, both the genetic father and the mother must sign a form
acknowledging the genetic father's paternity, and then prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the husband is not the child's father, or else obtain the husband's
written consent. MINN. STAT. § 257.55(l)(e), (2) (2010). In California, the genetic
father, or any other involved party, must obtain a court order to have blood tests
conducted. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7551 (West 2009). In Mississippi, the genetic father is
the legal father only if the mother proves non-access by, or the impotency of, her
husband. Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp. v. Neuman, 322 F. Supp. 1229, 1237 (S.D. Miss.
1970). In Louisiana, both the husband and the genetic father may be considered "dual
parents." Munson v. Washington, 747 So. 2d 1245, 1247 (La. Ct. App. 1999).
Determining legal paternity is even more varied when artificial insemination is the
source of the genetic father's tie. See Kyle C. Velte, Egging on Lesbian Maternity: The
Legal Implications of Tri-Gametic In Vitro Fertilization, 7 AM. U.J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y
& L. 431, 442-43 (1999) ("Of the thirty-four states that currently have legislation
dealing with [artificial insemination], sixteen have statutes that address [it] only in
the context of marriage.").
308 [Vol. 62:2
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precedent, this Part shows that only legal parents have a
fundamental right to raise one's child. In other words, only those
persons granted the legal status of parentage by state statute after
the child is born have a fundamental right to raise a child.
Recognizing that state parentage statutes determine who will
exercise the fundamental right to raise one's child, Part IV
reconsiders the role of the State in drafting those statutes. This Part
argues that because a child has constitutional rights at the moment
of birth and the legal parents have yet to be determined, the State is
obligated to consider the needs and rights of the child when drafting
its parentage statutes. In particular, states must adopt parentage
statutes that guarantee the child's fundamental right to legal
parents at birth. Part IV defines and explains this right.
Part V concludes with a discussion of how states guarantee the
fundamental right to legal parents at birth. Part V argues that at
the moment of a child's birth, state statutes must recognize the
genetic parents as the legal parents of children conceived through
sexual reproduction, and the intended parents as the legal parents of
children conceived through assisted reproductive technology. Only
by guaranteeing the child's fundamental right to parents at birth
through this designation of parental rights will state parentage
statutes be constitutional.
II. CHILDREN'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Children are protected by the Constitution and possess
constitutional rights from the moment they are born.11 As the
Supreme Court has stated, "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor
the Bill of Rights is for adults alone."12 Though the Court has, at
times, limited children's constitutional rights,13 it has clearly held
11. James G. Dwyer, A Constitutional Birthright: The State, Parentage, and the
Rights of Newborn Persons, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 755, 790 (2009) [hereinafter Dwyer,
Constitutional Birthright] ("[C]hildren are persons who have rights under the federal
Constitution.").
12. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (holding that children have due process
rights in criminal proceedings including the right to appropriate notice, counsel,
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and against self-incrimination).
13. See Francis Barry McCarthy, The Confused Constitutional Status and Meaning
of Parental Rights, 22 GA. L. REV. 975, 1013-14 (1988). The three justifications put
forth by the Supreme Court for not fully extending some constitutional rights to
children are: "the peculiar vulnerability of children; [children's] inability to make
critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental
role in child rearing." Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979). The Court's analysis
of children's constitutional rights under Belotti can be understood as an "adult-minus"
approach, wherein the Court starts with the "specifics of adult rights and whittle[s
them] down to children's." Emily Buss, Constitutional Fidelity Through Children's
2010] 309
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that children are persons under the Fourteenth Amendment and are
entitled to substantive due process, privacy, and protection of their
liberty.14 For instance, the Fourteenth Amendment protects minors'
constitutional rights to obtain an abortion15 and to use
contraception.16 Indeed, in Carey v. Population Services
International, the Court specifically stated that the right to privacy
"extends to minors as well as to adults."17
Children hold constitutional rights under other provisions of the
Constitution, in addition to the Fourteenth Amendment. For
instance, the Court recognized children's free speech rights in Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, stating that
children are "possessed of fundamental rights which the State must
respect."18 The Court has also acknowledged children's right to
religious freedom under the First Amendment in a number of well-
known decisions, including West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette.19 Notably, the Barnette Court did not distinguish between
Rights, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 355, 355-56 (2005) (arguing that this traditionally-
accepted approach is deeply flawed and that the "special circumstances of childhood
[should] change how . . . constitutional principles are best achieved, whether that
means greater, lesser, or simply different rights for children'). The Court's
justifications for limiting children's rights do not apply to the fundamental right to
legal parents at birth that we advocate for in this Article. The fundamental right to
legal parents at birth is a right held by children at birth and is not an adult right that
can be "whittled down." Moreover, the right specifically addresses the three concerns
articulated by the Court in Belotti.
14. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
15. Id. (holding that a state "may not impose a blanket provision ... requiring the
consent of a parent or person in loco parentis as a condition for abortion of an
unmarried minor during the first 12 weeks of her pregnancy").
16. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1977) (holding that "[s]ince
the State may not impose a blanket prohibition, or even a blanket requirement of
parental consent, on the choice of a minor to terminate her pregnancy, the
constitutionality of a blanket prohibition of the distribution of contraceptives to minors
is a fortiori foreclosed").
17. Id. at 693.
18. 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969). In this case, the Court held that within a school,
student expression may not be suppressed unless school officials reasonably conclude
that it will "materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school."
Id. at 513.
19. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (defending two minors' refusals to salute the flag by
asserting that "[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their
faith therein'). Cf. Santa Fe Ind. School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 317 (2000) (finding
that school-sponsored prayer violated students' First Amendment right to free
exercise of religious beliefs); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218-19 (1972) (holding
that a Wisconsin statute mandating public school attendance past the eighth grade
interfered with freedom of religious expression of the Amish plaintiffs); Prince v.
310 [Vol. 62:2
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adults and children, effectively extending the constitutional right to
free exercise of religion without regard to age. 20
In the criminal context, the Court recognized children's
constitutional rights in the case of In re Gault.21 According to the
Gault Court, children have due process rights, including the right to
appropriate notice, counsel, confrontation and cross-examination of
witnesses, and against self-incrimination.22 Subsequent cases
further extended children's constitutional rights in criminal
proceedings by applying the requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt23 and the prohibition of double jeopardy to child
defendants.24
In the various cases recognizing children's rights, the Court did
not require that children reach a certain age before they exercise
their constitutional rights. Rather, the Court recognized that
children are born with constitutional rights.25 In other words,
children possess these rights at birth, before their legal parents are
even determined.
III. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO RAISE ONE'S CHILD
Although the Constitution never mentions marriage or
parenting, the Supreme Court has a long history of recognizing
constitutional rights in the context of the family.26 From Meyer v.
Nebraska27 in 1923 to Lawrence v. Texas28 in 2003, the Court has
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944) (acknowledging "[t]he rights of children to
exercise their religion, and of parents to give them religious training and to encourage
them in the practice of religious belief, as against preponderant sentiment and
assertion of state power voicing it").
20. The Barnette Court did not mention age at all. See 319 U.S. 624. Further, the
Court stated, "If there are any circumstances which permit an exception [to religious
freedom], they do not now occur to us." Id. at 642.
21. See 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
22. Id. at 30-57.
23. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that the reasonable doubt
standard of criminal law has constitutional stature and that juveniles, like adults, are
constitutionally entitled to proof beyond a reasonable doubt when they are charged
with a violation of a criminal law).
24. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); see also Carey v. Population Servs.
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 692 n.14 (1977) (noting that minors can access "a variety of rights
of defendants in criminal proceedings").
25. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)
("Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one
attains the state-defined age of majority.").
26. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, the Court stated that "the Constitution
protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is
deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
27. 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that a Nebraska statute forbidding students
HeinOnline  -- 62 Rutgers L. Rev. 311 2009-2010
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protected familial privacy from unnecessary governmental intrusion.
In 1965, in Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court first articulated the
"zone of privacy" that surrounds the family.29 Although Griswold
concerned the right to use contraceptives, the Court's holding
suggested that decisions involving marriage and child rearing are
inherently private and must be protected against government
intrusion.30 Indeed, throughout the twentieth century, the Court has
protected privacy rights relating to marriage and parenting. In
procreation cases such as Eisenstadt v. Bairdsl and Roe v. Wade;32
marriage cases such as Loving v. Virginia33 and Zablocki v.
Redhail;34 parenting cases such as Stanley v. Illinois35 and Moore v.
City of East Cleveland,36 and the most recent case of Lawrence v.
Texas37 protecting the fundamental right to sexual intimacy, the
Court has reinforced the notion that intimate relationships and the
family are constitutionally protected.38
below the eighth grade from being taught in any language other than English
interfered with the constitutional right of parents to raise their children).
28. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that a Texas law which prohibited sexual acts
between same-sex couples was a violation of the constitutional right to privacy).
29. 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (holding that a Connecticut law that prohibited the
use and distribution of contraceptives was an unconstitutional violation of the right to
privacy).
30. Id. at 484-86.
31. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that a Massachusetts statute that prohibited
distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons was a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
32. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that a woman's right to choose to terminate her
pregnancy prior to viability is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution).
33. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that a Virginia antimiscegenation statute which
prohibited whites from marrying non-whites violated the fundamental right to marry
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment).
34. 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (holding that a Wisconsin statute requiring certain
residents, specifically noncustodial parents of children for whom they are obligated to
support, to obtain a court order prior to receiving a marriage license interferes with
their constitutional right to marry).
35. 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (holding an Illinois law that denied an unmarried father a
hearing on parental fitness before the State took custody of his genetic child
unconstitutional).
36. 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (holding unconstitutional a zoning restriction that limited
occupation to single families and defined "family" in such a way as to exclude a
grandmother living with her son and two grandsons).
37. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
38. In fact, in most of these cases the Court merely cited prior decisions for support
of this proposition. See, e.g., id. at 573-74 (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S 833, 851 (1992) for the proposition that the liberty" provision of
the Due Process Clause protects a zone of privacy that includes "marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education'); Zablocki v. Redhail,
HeinOnline  -- 62 Rutgers L. Rev. 312 2009-2010
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The constitutional protection of the family includes the
fundamental right to raise one's child. In Meyer v. State of Nebraska
and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court held that parents have a
right to determine the language in which their children are educated
and whether their children attend a private or public school.39 In
Santosky v. Kramer, the Court extended the fundamental right to
raise one's child beyond the educational setting.40 Furthermore, in
Prince v. Massachusetts and Moore v. City of East Cleveland, the
Court held that the fundamental right to raise one's child can be
granted to a person other than a genetic parent.41 As such, the
constitutional "zone of privacy" that protects the fundamental right
to raise one's child is firmly rooted in Supreme Court doctrine, and
this Article takes no issue with its existence or scope.42 It is the goal
of this Article, however, to draw attention to the powerful role the
State plays in determining who can exercise the fundamental right to
raise one's child.
It is commonly accepted that only a child's legal parents can
exercise the fundamental right to raise that child. What is not often
considered, however, is how a person becomes a legal parent. Legal
parentage is a status that is conferred by a state statute. Therefore,
before a person can exercise the fundamental right to raise one's
child, the State must deem that person to be a legal parent. In this
way, we argue, it is the State that actually decides who may exercise
the fundamental right to raise one's child.
A. The State Decides Who Can Exercise the Fundamental Right
434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (citing Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) for the
proposition that marriage is "the most important relation in life"); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) for
the proposition that the right to procreate is a "fundamental" decision); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (citing May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953) for
the proposition that the fundamental right to raise one's child is a right "far more
precious. . . than property rights"); Maynard, 125 U.S. 190, 210 (1888) (citing Adams v.
Palmer, 51 Me. 481, 483 (1863) for the proposition that marriage is "the foundation of
the family and of society").
39. 262 U.S. 390, 400, 403 (1923); 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that an Oregon
statute requiring that children be educated in public schools violated the
constitutional right of parents to raise their children).
40. See generally 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
41. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505-06 (1977) (holding that
the grandmother of two young boys was a legal custodian and possessed the same
rights as a parent); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 161 (1944) (assuming that
the aunt of a nine-year-old girl was the valid and lawful custodian and had equivalent
rights to those of a parent).
42. In Troxel v. Granville, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that parents have a
fundamental right to direct the upbringing of their children. 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).
2010] 313
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to Raise One's Child
Typically, privacy rights are thought of as merely protecting us
from government interference. What is not often considered,
however, is the role state statutes play in actually deciding who can
exercise some fundamental rights. We argue that it is actually the
State, through state statutes, and not the U.S. Constitution alone,
that determines who can exercise the fundamental right to raise
one's child. Although this may sound surprising, it is a role that is
routinely accepted when it comes to another privacy right - the
fundamental right to marriage.
For instance, whether a person can get married in State A
depends on State A's marriage statute. State A's marriage statute
may have an age or consanguinity requirement,43 require a blood test
before issuing a marriage license,44 or prohibit same-sex couples
from marrying.45 If a couple does not meet the requirements of the
state statute, they cannot exercise the constitutionally protected
right to marriage or experience the privacy that accompanies
marriage.
The Supreme Court addressed the role state statutes play in
providing access to fundamental marriage rights in Loving v.
Virginia,46 Zablocki v. Redhail,47 and Turner v. Safley.48 In each of
those cases, the petitioners did not protest governmental interference
in their marriage. Rather, the petitioners sought access to the right
to marry.49 In challenging Virginia's antimiscegenation law, the
claimants in Loving did not ask the State to stop interfering in their
43. See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-102 (LexisNexis 2005) (requiring both male and
female to be the age of seventeen or older to marry); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-206 (2008)
(prohibiting marriage between first cousins).
44. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-203 (2009) (requiring females to have a blood
test for rubella before obtaining a marriage license); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-5(e)
(West 2010) (requiring marriage license applicant to have a blood test to show
applicant is free of syphilis).
45. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.03 (West 2010) (prohibiting "a marriage between
persons of the same sex"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (2009) (defining marriage as "the
legally recognized union of two people" and eliminating previous language that limited
marriage to one man and one woman).
46. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
47. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
48. 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (holding that a Missouri regulation that prohibited prison
inmates from marrying without permission from the prison superintendant was
unconstitutional).
49. Professor Carlos Ball calls these the "failure to recognize" marriage cases as
opposed to the "interference with marriage" cases of Skinner, Poe, and Griswold.
Carlos Ball, The Positive in the Fundamental Right to Marry: Same-Sex Marriage in
the Aftermath of Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1184, 1192-1203 (2004).
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marriage, but rather asked the State to recognize their relationship
as a marriage.50 Similarly, the Court struck down the Wisconsin
statute that prohibited individuals who owed child support from
marrying in Zablocki,51 and the Missouri statute in Turner that
required prisoners to gain approval from prison authorities before
they could marry.52 In both cases, the Court held that the State's
failure to provide a statutory mechanism for the petitioners to access
marriage violated their fundamental rights.53 In other words,
without a statute allowing them to marry, they were unable to
experience the "zone of privacy" that protects married couples from
governmental interference.54
Although the Court struck down the statutes at issue in these
cases, the Court neither questioned the State's authority to
determine who can access marriage nor the State's role in adopting
statutes that establish qualifications for accessing the fundamental
right to marriage. We argue that the State exercises the same
authority and plays the same role with regards to the fundamental
right to raise one's child. Like marriage, the State grants access to
the fundamental right to raise one's child when it determines who
can become a legal parent via state statute.
1. Only Legal Parents Have a Fundamental Right to Raise
One's Child
The fundamental right to raise one's child functions in the same
way as the fundamental right to marriage. The State, through a
state statute, determines who is a legal parent and, therefore, who
can exercise the fundamental right to raise one's child.65 Stanley v.
Illinois56 and Caban v. Mohammed57 are two Supreme Court cases
50. Id. at 1197.
51. Id. at 1198-99.
52. Id. at 1200-03.
53. In other words, without a state statute providing access to marriage, civil
marriage cannot exist. Therefore, a state's failure to provide statutory access to
marriage can, in and of itself, constitute a violation of the fundamental right to marry.
See id. at 1198 ("[T]he failure of the state to act can constitute a violation of the
fundamental right to marry.").
54. These cases have led scholars like Carlos Ball to conclude that "[i]t is State
action that creates the very institution that makes the exercise of the fundamental
right to liberty in the context of marriage possible." Id. at 1206 (emphasis added).
55. Carbone & Cahn, supra note 4, at 1014 (stating that "[t]he law draws bright
line distinctions between parents and non-parents and attributes decision-making
power exclusively to the former").
56. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
57. 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (holding invalid a New York statute that did not require
consent from the genetic father before a child born out of wedlock could be placed for
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that dealt specifically with the inability of an adult to exercise his
right to raise his child because he was not a legal parent pursuant to
state statute. In Stanley v. Illinois, the unwed, genetic father of two
children challenged the denial of his constitutional right to raise his
children.58 According to Illinois law, unwed fathers were not legal
parents and therefore had no constitutional right to raise their
children.59 As explained by the Court, although Stanley clearly met
the common definition of "parent,"60 he was not a legal parent
pursuant to Illinois statute and was, therefore, "a stranger to his
children" under Illinois law.61 Similarly, in Caban v. Mohammed, an
unwed, genetic father objected to the adoption of his two children by
the mother's husband.62 According to state statute, consent to an
adoption was only required from a child's legal parents, and unwed
fathers were not legal parents. 63 Caban filed suit, arguing that the
state statute denied him his constitutional right to raise his
children.64 In both Stanley and Caban, there was no dispute as to
whether the petitioner was the genetic father or whether he had a
parental relationship with his children. Instead, both disputes
concerned who the state statute recognized as a legal parent.6 5
Without the status of legal parent conveyed under state statute, the
genetic father did not have a fundamental right to raise his children.
Although the Court ultimately recognized Stanley and Caban as
legal parents, thereby granting them the right to raise their
children,66 not all genetic fathers have fared so well. In Quillion v.
Walcott, for instance, a genetic father tried to exercise his
fundamental right to raise his child by preventing the birth mother's
adoption).
58. The children lived with their genetic mother and, intermittently, with their
genetic father. The mother and father never married. After the mother died, the
children became wards of the State and were removed from Stanley's custody.
Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646-47.
59. A person could be a legal parent only if he or she gave birth to the child, was
married to the birth mother, or adopted the child. Stanley did not meet any of these
statutory requirements. Id. at 648-50.
60. The common definition of parent is "one that begets or brings forth offspring"
or "a person who brings up and cares for another." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 900 (11th ed. 2003). The legal definition for parent, however, is the
'lawful father or mother of someone." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1222 (9th ed. 2009).
61. 405 U.S. at 648.
62. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
63. Id. at 385-87.
64. Id. at 381-82.
65. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646-47; Caban, 441 U.S. at 385.
66. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658; Caban, 441 U.S. at 308.
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husband from adopting the child.67 The Court held that the genetic
father did not have a constitutional right to raise his child because he
was not the legal father.68 Although there was no dispute that
Quillion was the child's genetic father, he had never "legitimated" the
child as required by state law.69 As a result, the Court held that the
mother was the child's only legal parent and had "exclusive
authority" to exercise the fundamental right to raise the child. 70
The Court reached a similar conclusion in Lehr v. Robertson.71
In that case, a genetic father was denied the right to stop the
adoption of his child because he had not "ensured"72 his
constitutional right by comporting with state law and signing a
paternity registry.73 The Court held that because state law did not
recognize Lehr as a legal parent, he did not have a constitutional
right to raise his child and was thus unable to prevent the adoption
of his child.74
Similarly, a state statute determined who could access the
fundamental right to raise one's child in Michael H. v. Gerald D.75 In
that case, the Court held that the genetic father was not the legal
father of the child and did not have a constitutional right to raise his
child because the state statute identified the birth mother's husband
as the legal father.76 The fact that Michael H. was the child's genetic
father did not matter. The state statute determined legal parentage
status and granted the right to raise the child to the genetic mother
67. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
68. The state statute provided the means for a natural father of a nonmarital child
to legitimate his child. Id. at 248. Because Quilloin failed to legitimize his child, the
Court held that he was not a legal father and did not have right to prevent the
adoption. Id. at 255.
69. See id. at 253-54.
70. Id. at 249. According to the Court, "any constitutionally protected interest
appellant might have had was lost by his failure to petition for legitimation." Id. at
254.
71. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
72. See id. at 266.
73. Id. at 251. The genetic mother never conceded that Lehr was the genetic
father, but the Court assumed it for purposes of the case. Id. at 250 n.3.
74. The Court noted that although "[iut is self-evident that [parent-child
relationships] are sufficiently vital to merit constitutional protection in appropriate
cases," states are allowed to determine which relationships are "appropriate" through
state statutes. Id. at 256-57.
75. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
76. The Court held that Michael did not have a "right to have himself declared the
natural father and thereby to obtain parental prerogatives." Id. at 126 (emphasis in
original). Under the California statute, genetic fathers did not possess the fundamental
right to raise one's child. Id. at 117. Rather, that right was granted by state statute to the
husband of the child's mother. Id.
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and her husband.77 According to the Court, "as a matter of [state]
law, [Michael] is not a 'parent."'78
Similar to marriage, the Supreme Court has not questioned the
State's authority in determining who can access legal parentage and
the accompanying fundamental right to raise one's child. Although
the Court has, at times, struck down state parentage statutes as
unconstitutional, the Court has repeatedly recognized and reinforced
the State's role in determining who can exercise the fundamental
right to raise one's child.
2. Recognizing the Role State Statutes Play in Determining
Parentage
For some, the idea that the State has a role in defining who we
can marry is more palatable than the fact that the State determines
whether we can parent our children. We are not raised believing
that we can marry whomever we want, but we certainly grow up
thinking we will be able to raise our genetic children.79 The
fundamental right to raise one's child, however, can only be exercised
after the State creates a legal parent-child relationship. As a result,
we only get to raise the children whom the State deems to be our
legal children.
The reason the State's role in determining legal parentage is
surprising is because its operation is often invisible. For example, in
every state, a self-executing parentage statute identifies the woman
who gives birth to a child as that child's legal mother.80 In the
overwhelming majority of births, this is the expected outcome. The
person who "expects" to have a fundamental right to raise the child is
granted that right by state statute. This process is so automatic that
the birth mother does not even realize the State's role in creating the
protected legal relationship between her and the child.81
77. According to the Court, "California declares it to be, except in limited
circumstances, irrelevant for paternity purposes whether a child conceived during, and
born into, an existing marriage was begotten by someone other than the husband." Id. at
119 (emphasis in original).
78. Id. at 133 (Stevens, J., concurring).
79. See Dwyer, Constitutional Birthright, supra note 11, at 763 ("One might think
it natural, even divinely ordained, that biological parents become the custodians of a
baby.").
80. See James G. Dwyer, A Taxonomy of Children's Existing Rights in State
Decision Making About Their Relationship, 11 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 845, 859 n.28
(2003) [hereinafter Dwyer, Taxonomy] (providing an extensive list of state statutes
that define the woman who gave birth to the child as the legal mother).
81. See Dwyer, Constitutional Birthright, supra note 11, at 762, 764
(acknowledging that the state's role in creating legal parent-child relationships goes
unnoticed and is often taken for granted).
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Similarly, every state has a statute presuming that the birth
mother's husband is the legal father of the child.82 In the roughly 60
percent of births in the United States that take place within a
marriage,83 this is typically the desired outcome. The husband is
assumed to be - and quite often is - the genetic father of the child
and expects to have a fundamental right to raise the child. Here
again, the operation of the state statute is so automatic that the man
is rarely aware that the right to raise the child was bestowed on him
by state statute.
When children are born outside of marriage, the role of state
statutes in determining legal parentage becomes more visible. Cases
like Stanley, Caban, Quilloin, Lehr, and Michael H. arose because
the state statute did not identify the genetic father as the legal
father.84 These men assumed they had a constitutional right to raise
their children from birth. Once they tried to exercise that right,
however, they realized that the State chooses who possesses the
fundamental right to raise one's child, and that the state did not
choose them. When children are conceived by means other than
sexual reproduction, the power of state parentage statutes becomes
even more apparent.85 Many states do not even have parentage
statutes that designate parents for children conceived via assisted
reproductive technology.86 As a result, the legal parents of these
children are often established by a court order.87 Absent a state
statute, courts often have difficulty determining who possesses the
82. States vary in the application of the presumption and the opportunity to rebut
it. Carbone & Cahn, supra note 4, at 1051 (citing Diane S. Kaplan, Why Truth Is Not a
Defense in Paternity Actions, 10 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 69, 73, 76, 79 (2000)).
83. JOYCE A. MARTIN ET AL., BIRTHS: FINAL DATA FOR 2003, 54 NATL VITAL STAT.
REP. 48-49 (2005), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/datalnvsr/nvsr54/nvsr54_02.pdf.
84. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S.
248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S.
246 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
85. Conception by means other than sexual intercourse is referred to as assisted
reproductive technology or ART. Black's Law Dictionary defines ART as "[any
medical means of aiding human reproduction." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 139 (9th ed.
2009).
86. See discussion infra Part V.C.
87. See Elisa B. v. Superior Court of El Dorado County, 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005)
(holding that the children born to a lesbian couple during a domestic partnership have
two legal mothers); Smith v. Brown, 718 N.E.2d 844, 846 (Mass. 1999) (permitting a
pre-birth order issued by the Probate and Family Court determining paternity in the
case of a gestational surrogacy arrangement to stand); Belsito v. Clark, 67 Ohio Misc.
2d 54, 65 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1994) (determining by court order that individuals who
provide the genes for a child are the natural parents of the child); Johnson v. Calvert,
851 P.2d 776, 787 (Cal. 1993) (holding that the genetic mother of a child born using a
gestational surrogate was the "natural" mother).
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fundamental right to raise the child.88 So, although a child has
constitutional rights from the moment of birth, it takes a state
statute - and sometimes a court order-to determine who can
exercise the constitutional right to raise the child. Therefore, under
the law, the child comes first and the legal parents come second.
B. The Conditional Fundamental Right to Raise One's Child
The powerful role of the State in controlling who can exercise the
fundamental right to raise one's child is further demonstrated by the
fact that the right is granted on a conditional basis. Unlike other
family privacy rights, the fundamental right to raise one's child
comes with a set of expectations. The Court has described the
fundamental right to raise one's child as an "obligation"89 and a.
"duty"90 that the State may ultimately take away if not performed
adequately.91 The Court does not use similar language when
discussing other privacy rights such as procreation or marriage.
People are not "obligated" to procreate or marry and do not have a
"duty" to perform those rights in a certain way. Furthermore, people
never lose the right to marry or the right to procreate. 92
The fundamental right to raise one's child, however, is different. If
88. Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. & Steven H. Snyder, Clarifying the Law of ART: The
New American Bar Association Model Act Governing Assisted Reproduction
Technology, 42 FAM L. Q. 203, 204, 209 n.23 (arguing that the lack of guidance
regarding parentage of children conceived through ART has caused courts to request
legislation from state legislatures offering the necessary guidance); see also In re
Buzzanca, 61 Cal. App. 4th 1410, 1428 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) ("Again we must call on the
Legislature to sort out the parental rights and responsibilities of those involved in
artificial reproduction.").
89. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211-12 (1888) (stating that in the relationship
"of parent and child, the obligations ... arise not from the consent of concurring
minds, but are the creation of the law itself' (quoting Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 480,
485 (1863)).
90. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (stating that "[t]he child is
not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have
the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations'); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (stating that "it is the
natural duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to their station in
life').
91. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 48.424 (West 2010) (describing the procedure for a fact-
finding hearing "to determine whether grounds exist for the termination of parental
rights").
92. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that a statute
authorizing compulsory sterilization of habitual criminals is unconstitutional);
GLENDA RILEY, DIVORCE: AN AMERICAN TRADITION 172 (1991) (examining the
increasing regularity of divorce and remarriage); see also Carey v. Population Servs.
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1997) (stating that "[tihe decision whether or not to beget or
bear a child is at the very heart of. . . constitutionally protected choices").
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a state statute deems a person to be a legal parent, she is "obligated" to
be the child's legal parent, regardless of her desire to take on that
responsibility.93 Moreover, a person is not granted the fundamental
right to raise one's child so that she or he can do what he or she
wants with that child. Instead, the responsibility of raising a child is
entrusted to the person the State presumes is most likely to perform
the parental "duties" effectively.94 In fact, the Court has said that
parents have a fundamental right to raise their children because they
are the persons presumed to act in the best interests of the
children.95
As a result, state parentage statutes create a mutual bargain. In
exchange for fulfilling the duties of parentage, the parent gains the
fundamental right to raise the child. The parent retains that right only
as long as she acts in the best interests of the child. If a parent fails to
fulfill her part of the bargain, the "contract" is breached and the State
may rescind the fundamental right to raise the child. In other words, if
a person is "obligated" to be a child's legal parent, but fails to fulfill
her parental "duties," legal mechanisms exist by which the State can
rescind the parent's fundamental right to raise the child.96
The fundamental right to raise one's child is an important right
granted to the adults whom the State presumes will act in a child's
best interests. This right, however, can only be exercised by the
adults who are granted the status of legal parents by a state statute.
This reality gives rise to an important question: what exactly should
the state consider when it decides who will exercise the fundamental
right to raise one's child?
IV. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO LEGAL PARENTS AT BIRTH
In drafting the parentage statutes that determine who a child's
legal parents will be, the State's foremost consideration must be the
93. See Dwyer, Constitutional Birthright, supra note 11, at 762-63.
94. McCarthy, supra note 13, at 1018-20 (asserting that parental rights are
justified on the basis that parents act in their child's best interest).
95. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (stating that the Court has protected
the fundamental right to raise one's child because the "natural bonds of affection lead
parents to act in the best interests of their children").
96. If a parent neglects or harms a child, the State can remove the child from the
parent's custody and can even terminate the parent's right to raise the child. See, e.g.,
WIS. STAT. § 48.424 (2010) (stating that after a fact-finding hearing, the court may
terminate parental rights if the parent is found unfit). Therefore, the ability to
exercise the fundamental right to raise one's child is dependent on gaining and
keeping the status of legal parent as determined by state statute. In Wisconsin v.
Yoder, for example, the Court stated that "[t]o be sure, the power of the parent ... may
be subject to limitation . . . if it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the
health or safety of the child." 406 U.S. 205, 233-34 (1972).
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child's constitutional rights. The child holds those rights from the
moment of birth. The child's parents, however, do not obtain the
fundamental right to raise the child until a state statute designates
them as legal parents. During this discrete period of time - when a
child has constitutional rights, but no legal parent has been
designated to exercise the fundamental right to raise the child-the
State is solely responsible for protecting the child's constitutional
rights.
It is well accepted that, pursuant to the doctrine of parens
patriae, states are obligated to care for vulnerable children. We
argue that the parens patriae power also obligates states to protect
children's constitutional rights. Furthermore, we argue that states
must protect children's constitutional rights by adopting parentage
statutes that guarantee their First and Fourteenth Amendment right
to legal parents at birth.
A. The State's Parens Patriae Power
Pursuant to the common law doctrine of parens patriae, the
State is the protector of "those unable to care for themselves."97 As
such, the State must "protect and promote the welfare of children."98
The State most commonly exercises its parens patriae power when it
breaks up existing parent-child relationships.99 Generally, once the
State designates legal parents for a child, the legal parents may
exercise the fundamental right to raise the child free from
government interference.100 If the legal parents cease to act in the
child's best interests, however, the State, under parens patriae, may
97. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1221 (9th ed. 2009). Historically, children and
persons with mental or physical disabilities warranted state protection under parens
patriae. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 583 (1975) ('The classic example of
[the State's pareas patriae] role is when a State undertakes to act as 'the general
guardian of all infants, idiots, and lunatics."' (quoting Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405
U.S. 251, 257 (1972))).
98. Moe v. Dinkins, 533 F. Supp. 623, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), affd, 669 F.2d 67 (2d
Cir. 1982); see also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) ("Children, by definition,
are not assumed to have the capacity to take care of themselves."); Dwyer,
Constitutional Birthright, supra note 11, at 766 ("The state acts vis a vis every
newborn baby in a 'protective and provisional role', pursuant to its long-recognized
parens patriae authority .... ) (internal quotations omitted); Ruth Arlene W. Howe,
Race Matters in Adoption, 42 FAM. L.Q. 465, 467 n. 10 (2008) (noting that in the United
States, parens patriae refers to the State's role as protector of the interests of
children).
99. Howe, supra note 98, at 467 (pointing out that under parens patriae, parents
"may have their parental rights terminated".
100. See Schall, 467 U.S. at 265 ("[Children] are assumed to be subject to the
control of their parents .... ").
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intervene in the parent-child relationship.101 For instance, in cases
involving child neglect or custody determinations during a divorce,
the State acts as the child's agent pursuant to its parens patriae
power and makes a legal decision about parentage that corresponds
with the child's best interests. 102
Parens patriae not only empowers the State to break up existing
parent-child relationships, it also enables the State to create such
relationships. 103 In adoption proceedings, for instance, the State
exercises its parens patriae power to form legal parent-child
relationships. 104 Specifically, when approving adoptive parents for a
child, the State acts as the child's agent in selecting parents that will
act in the child's best interest.105
It is our contention that, in addition to determining parental
fitness and approving adoptions, the State exercises its parens
patriae power when it drafts statutes that determine who will
become a child's legal parents. When a child is born she is a juridical
person with constitutional rights, but is unable to care for herself or
exercise her constitutional rights. Therefore, the first and most
profound act a state takes under parens patriae is providing the child
with legal parents. 106 In other words, under parens patriae, the State
ensures a child's well-being by adopting a dependable, self-executing
parentage statute that assigns legal parents to every child at birth.
Once the State determines a child's legal parents, those individuals
assume the responsibility of protecting the child's welfare and
101. See id.; see also Tanya M. Washington, Throwing Black Babies Out with the
Bathwater: A Child-Centered Challenge to Same-Sex Adoption Bans, 6 HASTINGS RACE
& POVERTY L.J. 1, 29 (2009) (noting that the State has authority "to enforce a child's
liberty interest in freedom from incompetent parental care").
102. See JAMES G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 173, 197 (2006).
Similarly, in situations where the rights of incompetent individuals are contested, the
State acts as a proxy decision maker for the individual under parens patriae. Id. at
197. In the infamous case of Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497
U.S. 261, 315 (1990), the Supreme Court determined that the State's only interest in
connection with the cessation of medical treatment was a "parens patriae interest in
providing .. . Cruzan, now incompetent, with as accurate as possible a determination
of how she would exercise her rights under these circumstances."
103. Dwyer, Taxonomy, supra note 80, at 855 (noting that the state both creates and
terminates legal parent-child relationships).
104. Dwyer, Child Protection, supra note 4, at 412 (discussing state's parens patriae
role in adoption proceedings).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 411 (arguing that a justification for the state's creation of legal family
relationships for a newborn child is that children need caregivers but cannot choose
those persons themselves); Carbone & Cahn, supra note 4, at 1014-15 (calling
parentage determinations the "most important legal determination affecting children"
and the "centerpiece in the protection of children's interests").
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constitutional rights.
Although the State's role in parental fitness and adoption
proceedings is well-recognized, the State's exercise of its parens
patriae power when forming legal parent-child relationships at birth
is not often acknowledged. As discussed supra, when children are
born, most genetic parents assume they will be the child's legal
parents and are unaware of the State's role in creating legal parent-
child relationships.107 As experienced by Stanley, Caban, Lehr,
Quilloin, and Michael H., however, absent the operation of the
State's parens patriae power in adopting proper parentage statutes,
some parents are legal strangers to their children.
It is our position that the State's parens patriae power not only
gives it the authority to create legal parent-child relationships at
birth, it obligates the State to do so. Specifically, as discussed infra,
we argue that the State's parens patriae power requires it to draft
parentage statutes that guarantee every child's substantive due
process and intimate association right to legal parents at birth.
B. The State's Obligations Under Parens Patriae
Under the law, children have constitutional rights at birth. Due
to a child's minority, however, she is unable to exercise those rights
and the State, under parens patriae, must exercise and protect them
on her behalf. Therefore, when a state drafts a parentage statute, it
is obligated as the child's agent to ensure that the statute protects
her constitutional rights. Specifically, every state's parentage
statute must guarantee a child's fundamental right to legal parents
at birth.
A child's fundamental right to legal parents at birth is not a new
right.1o8 The laws governing parentage, however, have not required
formal recognition of this right until recently.109 This is because
state parentage statutes have historically provided the vast majority
of children with legal parents at birth.iio Due to new advances in
assisted reproductive technology, however, state statutes have
proven ineffective at designating legal parents at birth for all
children."ii The resulting legal battles have exposed the inadequacy
107. See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing the role that state statutes play in
determining parentage).
108. In 1989, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child recognized
children's fundamental right to legal parents at birth and the State's obligation to
assure the formation of a parent-child relationship. See Convention on the Rights of
the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc. AIRES/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989).
109. See Dwyer, Constitutional Birthright, supra note 11, at 762.
110. Id.
111. See Radhika Rao, Reconceiving Privacy: Relationships and Reproductive
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of current parentage statutes and the need to formally recognize the
fundamental right to legal parents at birth.112 This constitutional
right arises out of the substantive due process protection that the
Court has traditionally afforded the family, as well as the right to
intimate association protected by the First Amendment.
1. Substantive Due Process
As discussed supra, the Supreme Court has long recognized the
importance of protecting the family under substantive due process. 113
In the right to privacy cases concerning marriage, parenting,
procreation, and sexual intimacy, the Court has repeatedly held up
the family as the paradigmatic intimate relationship protected by the
right to privacy.114 According to the Court, matters involving the
family are among "the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy."115
The Court's substantive due process decisions protecting family
privacy have consistently focused on the importance of familial
relationships. As such, when it comes to the family, the right to
privacy is best understood not as an individual right, but as a
relational right.116 These protected family relationships are not only
between adults, but also between adults and children.117 Indeed,
Technology, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1077, 1079-80 (1998).
112. It is important to emphasize the temporal quality of the fundamental right to
legal parents at birth. We do not argue that children have a fundamental right to
legal parents throughout their minority. Rather, we argue that this right exists at the
time the child is born and terminates once the State designates the child's legal
parents. If the child later loses those legal parents for some reason, the State has no
duty to provide the child legal parents again, although the State does have an
obligation under parens patriae to take the child under its care. See, e.g., Lindley v.
Sullivan, 889 F.2d 124, 131 (7th Cir. 1989) ("[There is no fundamental right to
adopt."). The fundamental right to legal parents at birth is not the only fundamental
right that terminates at a certain point. The fundamental right to raise one's child, for
example, terminates when the child reaches the age of majority.
113. See Part III; see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
114. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) ("[O]ur laws and tradition
afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child rearing and education."); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965) (noting that the Meyer and Pierce decisions
"have respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter") (quoting
Prince, 321 U.S. at 166).
115. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
116. Rao, supra note 111, at 1078 (explaining that the right to privacy is not an
individual right but a right to freedom within intimate relationships).
117. See id. at 1093.
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children are even more dependent than adults on the "emotional
attachments" created by familial relationships and the important
role those attachments play in "promoting [the child's] way of life."118
The Constitution guarantees the right to privacy to both the parent
and the child by ensuring that each can form a relationship with the
other.119 Therefore, from the moment of birth, the child has a
substantive due process privacy right to form intimate, familial
relationships. 120 Under its parens patriae power, the State is
obligated to guarantee this "precious" right of the child. 121
2. The Right to Intimate Association
In addition to the Substantive Due Process Clause, the closely
aligned First Amendment right to intimate association protects the
relationship between a child and her parents.122 The Supreme Court
first recognized the right to intimate association in Roberts v. United
States Jaycees.123 In Roberts, the Court defined an "intimate
association" as a close and familiar personal relationship with
another that is in some significant way comparable to a marriage or
a family relationship. 124 The Court provided two rationales for the
118. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256-57 (1983).
119. Rao, supra note 111, at 1102-05.
120. See id.
121. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (quoting May v. Anderson, 345
U.S. 528, 533 (1953)).
122. See Patel v. Searles, 305 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984)) (noting that United States Jaycees Court
relied on substantive due process cases in support of the right to intimate association);
Nat'l Ass'n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. California Bd. of Psychology, 228
F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing IDK, Inc. v. Clark County, 836 F.2d 1185, 1193
(9th Cir. 1988)) (noting that Fourteenth Amendment protections extend to close-knit
relationships); Trujillo v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 768 F.2d 1186, 1188 (10th Cir. 1985)
(citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620) (noting that the Supreme Court "identified the
freedom of intimate association as an intrinsic element of personal liberty" that is a
substantive due process right).
123. 468 U.S. at 622.
124. Id. at 619-20. Notably, relationships that qualify as "intimate associations"
need not be based on genetics or marital status. Rather, the right to intimate
association protects any relationship that resembles that of a family. See Trujillo, 768
F.2d at 1189 n.5 (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620) ("Familial relationships .. . do not
form the outer limits of protected intimate relationships . . . 'a broad range of human
relationships ... may make greater or lesser claims to constitutional protection. . . .");
Tillman v. City of West Point, Miss., 953 F. Supp. 145, 150 (N.D. Miss. 1996) (quoting
Wallace v. Tex. Tech. Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1051 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that
relationships that entail "deep attachments and commitments to the necessary few
other individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts,
experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one's life," are
entitled to the protection of the right of intimate association); White v. Fla. Highway
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constitutional protection of intimate associations. First, the Court
recognized that a person's ability to freely engage in intimate
associations is an intrinsic element of personal liberty that must be
guarded against state intrusion.125 Second, the Court noted the
central role that such relationships play in defining one's identity.126
In drawing these conclusions, the Court in Roberts cited the family
privacy cases and recognized that the right to intimate association
derives, in part, from the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of
personal liberty. 127
Based on the Courts' holdings in the privacy cases under the
Fourteenth Amendment and the intimate association cases under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, we assert that the Court has
already constitutionally protected the intimate relationship that a
child forms with her legal parents. Our only addition to this well-
settled constitutional doctrine is that the right belongs to the child as
well as her parents and that it begins at the moment of birth. As a
result, the state is obligated to protect that right when it drafts its
parentage statutes.
Patrol, 928 F. Supp. 1153, 1158 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (quoting McCabe v. Sharrett, 12 F.3d
1558, 1563 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting that while the right of intimate association
necessarily protects familial relationships, it also extends to other relationships to the
extent "those attachments share the qualities distinctive to family relationships"); La.
Debating & Literacy Ass'n v. City of New Orleans, 42 F.3d 1483, 1496-99 nn.23-32.
(5th Cir. 1995) (noting that the right to intimate association protects relationships
small in size, restrictive in membership, that seek to remain isolated, and are located
"on the spectrum of personal attachments ... near those that are 'most intimate"').
Furthermore, although the Lawrence Court did not cite intimate association as
support for its recognition of an adult's right to engage in private, consensual sexual
activity, commentators have since argued that Lawrence implicitly validated the right
of intimate association. See Nancy Catherine Marcus, The Freedom of Intimate
Association in the Twenty First Century, 16 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 269 (2006).
Like the analysis employed by the Roberts Court, the Lawrence Court emphasized the
necessity of protecting intimate relationships from state intrusion. See Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). The expansion of intimate association protections to non-
genetic relationships, provided those relationships demonstrate a certain amount of
intimacy and seclusion, indicates that courts are increasingly willing to protect non-
traditional relationships.
125. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
126. Id. at 619.
127. In support of these positions, the Roberts Court cited the familiar Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process cases, including Pierce, Zablocki, Moore, Yoder,
and Griswold. See id. Similarly, legal scholar Kenneth Karst argues that the right to
intimate association stems from the Constitution's First Amendment, equal protection
and substantive due process protections. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of
Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 625, 655-66 (1980).
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3. The Fundamental Right to Legal Parents at Birth
At the moment of birth, a child possesses a First and Fourteenth
Amendment right to form intimate, familial relationships. As a
child's first intimate, familial relationship is with her legal parents,
the child has a fundamental right to legal parents at birth. The
State, as parens patriae, is obligated to protect a child's
constitutional rights at birth. Thus, we argue that the first and most
profound action a state takes as parens patriae is to adopt a statute
that determines children's legal parents at birth. Moreover, we
argue that the state is obligated to adopt parentage statutes that
guarantee every child's fundamental right to legal parents at birth.
A child's most important and intimate familial relationship is
with her parent. 128 Parents are central to a child's life experience.
Without parents, a child can neither subsist nor thrive. Moreover, a
child needs parents to preserve her liberty and protect her rights.129
A child's life and well-being is therefore dependent upon legal
familial relationships that are stable and secure. In other words, a
child has a fundamental right to legal parents at birth.
The State, as parens patriae, must protect a child's constitutional
rights at birth.130 Therefore, the State is obligated to protect a child's
fundamental right to legal parents at birth. To accomplish this task,
the State must adopt parentage statutes that provide every child
with a legally protected parent-child relationship at birth. The State
fulfills this obligation by adopting a self-executing parentage statute
that automatically designates a child's legal parents at the moment
of birth.
The next section discusses who a state must designate as a
child's legal parents. Since the State is obligated to provide a
parentage statute that protects the fundamental right to legal
parents at birth, the next question is whether the State is obligated
to designate particular people as the child's legal parents? We argue
that in order to guarantee the child's fundamental right to legal
parents at birth, the state must designate specific persons as the
child's legal parents.
128. See United States v. Smith, 436 F.3d 307, 310 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting that the
parent-child relationship is constitutionally protected); Henley v. Tullahoma City Sch.
Sys., 84 F. App'x 534, 543 (6th Cir. 2003) ( "[The right of intimate association attaches
to familial relations like those between father and daughter."); Patel v. Searles, 305
F.3d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 2002) ("[P]arent/child relationships are obviously among the
most intimate ... [a]s to warrant the highest level of constitutional protection.").
129. See Dwyer, Child Protection, supra note 4, at 415 ("[The state's creation of
parent-child relationships effectively determines the basic life prospects of persons and
the likelihood of their experiencing happiness and fulfillment").
130. See id. at 411-15.
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V. HOW THE STATE GUARANTEES THE CHILD'S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
To LEGAL PARENTS AT BIRTH
At the moment of birth, a child has constitutional rights and the
State, as parens patriae, is obligated to guarantee those rights. To
fulfill the child's fundamental right to legal parents at birth, the
State must adopt a self-executing parentage statute that designates
legal parents for every child at birth. The State cannot, however,
undertake this responsibility in an arbitrary manner.131 The State
cannot, for example, sell legal parentage status to the highest bidder
or give it away in a lottery. 132 Similarly, the State cannot grant legal
parentage status to certain persons in an effort to bolster specific
social mores or discourage relationships thought to be immoral.
Although current parentage statutes are self-executing and
provide legal parents for most children at birth, 133 the current system
fails for several reasons. First, current methods of parentage
determination are not based on the child's fundamental right to legal
parents at birth. Rather, the current method uses a series of
presumptions that are aimed at imposing social values or satisfying
the expectations of adults. Second, a cornerstone of the current
system - the marital presumption - is derived from outdated social
norms and can create legal parentage designations that violate the
fundamental right to legal parents at birth. Third, current methods
do not definitively determine legal parents at birth for every child.
Rather, court dockets are filled with cases in which legal parentage is
disputed, particularly in situations that involve children conceived
through assisted reproductive technology (ART). Many of these
disputes - and the resulting uncertainty for the children involved -
could be avoided if legal parentage was determined at birth for all
children. To address the failings of the current system and
guarantee every child's fundamental right to legal parents at birth,
131. See e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (stating that the State's
parens patriae power is not "all-encompassing," but limited to what is in the best
interest of the child overall).
132. See Jennifer S. Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN &
L. 429, 454 (2007) (stating that the Constitution protects family privacy rights
"precisely to prevent the state from distributing babies according to its own
standards"); Annette Ruth Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 683, 687 (2001) (comparing state parentage statutes based on
genetic relation to more arbitrary or discretionary parentage schemes, such as a
lottery or a "best-fit parent" system).
133. Birth mothers are legal mothers at birth, and husbands of birth mothers are
legal fathers at birth, due to self-executing statutes. See infra text accompanying note
140.
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we recommend three changes to state parentage statutes.134 The
following paragraphs summarize these changes, which we discuss in
detail below.
First, all presumptions must be removed from parentage
statutes. Guaranteeing every child's fundamental right to legal
parents at birth requires clear determinations of legal parentage at
the moment of birth. Presumptions are subject to social pressure and
judicial discretion and often give rise to lengthy legal disputes. The
resulting lack of clarity and litigation violate the child's fundamental
right to legal parents at birth. To avoid this result, states must
adopt self-executing statutes that make consistent, definitive
determinations of parentage at birth for every child.
Second, legal parentage of children conceived through sexual
reproduction should be granted to the child's genetic parents. Basing
legal parentage of children conceived through sexual reproduction on
a genetic relationship eliminates any unnecessary doubt regarding
parentage and places the child with the persons most likely to act in
the child's best interest. 135
Third, legal parentage of children conceived through ART should
be vested in the child's intended parents. Doing so would remove
unnecessary doubt as to the legal parents of ART children, which
often leads to litigation.136 In addition, like the genetic parents for
children conceived through sexual reproduction, the intended parents
are the people who are most likely to act in the child's best
interest. 137
A. The End of Parentage Presumptions
Parentage statutes exist, in part, to make the process of
determining legal parentage as clear and efficient as possible at
134. Given their long history, changing parentage statutes may sound daunting, but
"states enjoy considerable latitude to reorient parentage law in a child-centered
direction." David D. Meyer, The Constitutionality of "Best Interests" Parentage, 14 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 857, 858 (2006).
135. Once legal parents are determined, those adults then have the legal duty and
obligation to act in the child's best interest and are protected from state interference in
those decisions by the fundamental right to raise one's child. Dwyer, Child Protection,
supra note 4, at 412. It follows then, that state parentage statutes must designate
those persons most likely to act in the child's best interest as the legal parents. Id. In
other words, the State's obligation to the child under parens patriae - the obligation
to act in the child's best interest - is transferred from the State to the legal parents.
Id. (noting that state parentage laws should place children in parent-child
relationships with the adults who would best promote the child's welfare).
136. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text (discussing questions over
parentage of ART children and ensuing litigation).
137. See discussion infra Part IV.C.2.
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birth, thereby avoiding litigation.138 Indeed, it would be impossible
to hold a fact-specific hearing every time a child is born to decide who
is best suited to be the child's legal parents.13 9 In fact, the
fundamental right to legal parents at birth, by definition, prohibits
factual inquiries into an individual child's needs or family situation
since such determinations can take months, if not years. Instead, the
fundamental right to legal parents at birth requires that states enact
a definitive, self-executing statutory system that designates legal
parents for every child at the moment of birth.
For this reason, states must eliminate the presumptions
currently used to determine parentage. Such presumptions give rise
to disputes in which courts consider adult behavior and social
customs to determine parentage, rather than the child's fundamental
right. Michael H. v. Gerald D. provides an example of the uncertain
and arbitrary results created by such presumptions.140 When
Michael H. was finally decided by the Supreme Court, the child
whose parentage was at issue in the dispute, Victoria, was eight
years old and lived with her mother, Carole; her mother's husband,
Gerald; and her two half-siblings born to Carole and Gerald.141
Given these circumstances, it is not surprising that the Court
determined Gerald was Victoria's legal father by applying the
marital presumption.142 Consider, however, what the outcome of a
case would have been had the Court decided who Victoria's legal
father was at or very near the date of her birth. At that time, Carol
was estranged from Gerald and lived with Michael, Victoria's genetic
father.143 Faced with those facts, a court could have applied the
presumption favoring genetic fathers and determined Michael to be
138. No one would benefit from a system that determined legal parents based on a
case-by--case, fact-intensive inquiry of the individual newborns' needs. The case load
would be unmanageable and the child would suffer the loss of the important bonding
that occurs between a child and parents in the early days, weeks, and months of life.
See Elizabeth Bartholet, Guiding Principles for Picking Parents, in GENETIC TIES AND
THE FAMiLY 132, 143 (Mark A. Rothstein et al. eds., 2005) (explaining that social
science research demonstrates that children need permanent, nurturing parents
beginning at early infancy); see also John Hill Lawrence, What Does it Mean to be a
"Parent"? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV.
353, 402-03 (1991) (citing studies that claim infants who fail to form bonds with adults
early in infancy have developmental problems later in life).
139. June Carbone, The Legal Definition of Parenthood: Uncertainty at the Core of
Family Identity, 65 LA. L. REV. 1295, 1300 (2005) ("Under this type of after-the-fact
decision-making, parental status remains uncertain until the day of the decision.").
140. 491 U.S 110, 110 (1989).
141. Id. at 115.
142. Id. at 130-32.
143. See id. at 114 (Carole and Michael lived together for significant periods of time
shortly after Victoria's birth).
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the legal father.144 A system that preserves a child's fundamental
right to legal parents at birth must provide for clear and final
determinations of parentage at birth. Doing so will ensure that
children like Victoria are not left in limbo for eight years without a
legal father.
It is true that removing presumptions from parentage statutes
requires the State to choose one factor by which to determine
parentage for all children, regardless of the circumstances of their
birth. We argue that this is the only way to guarantee every child's
fundamental right to legal parents at birth. Providing legal parents
at birth for every child, however, does not foreclose third-parties from
seeking parentage rights through the courts after the child is born.
The current legal system provides numerous mechanisms for courts
to evaluate legal parentage and, in certain circumstances, to reassign
those rights. The fundamental right to legal parents at birth does
not disturb that system in any way. Providing a clear determination
of legal parentage at birth will merely mean that in circumstances
where legal parentage is disputed, the child will have legal parents
throughout the litigation and will, at no point, be left without legal
parents.
B. Children Conceived Through Sexual Reproduction
The fundamental right to legal parents at birth requires that
state parentage statutes clearly and definitively determine the legal
parents of every child at birth. A critical issue, then, is what one
factor should determine legal parentage. Remembering that the
factor chosen must guarantee the child's fundamental right to legal
parents at birth, states must choose a factor that is both
determinative at birth and grants legal parentage to the people who
are most likely to care for the child and protect her rights - that is,
the persons most likely to act in her best interest. It is our
contention that, in order to guarantee the fundamental right to legal
parents at birth for children conceived through sexual reproduction,
state parentage statutes must award the genetic parents the status
of legal parents. In addition, states must eliminate the marital
presumption and require DNA testing to determine genetic paternity
before assigning legal paternal rights.
1. Why the Genetic Parents?
The current parentage system is founded on the assumption that
the genetic mother and father should be the legal parents of children
144. See Carbone & Cahn, supra note 4, at 1049-50, for a further discussion of the
possible outcomes if Michael H. had been decided earlier in Victoria's life.
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conceived through sexual reproduction.145 All fifty states have
statutes providing that the woman who gives birth to a child is the
legal mother.146 At the time these statutes were codified the only
way to conceive a child was through sexual reproduction. As a result,
every woman who gave birth to a child was the child's genetic and
legal mother. 147
The assumption that legal parentage should be based on a
genetic relationship is also found in every state's paternity
presumptions. The marital presumption, for instance, provides that
the birth mother's husband is the legal father.148 This presumption
is founded on the belief that the birth mother's husband is the
genetic father.149 The 1973 Uniform Parentage Act created a number
145. It is beyond the scope of this Article to address whether or not a child may
have more than two legal parents. Our argument is that the fundamental right to
legal parents at birth requires the State to provide at least one legal parent for every
child. Several other scholars have addressed whether a child should be able to have
more than two legal parents. See, e.g., Laura Nicole Althouse, Three's Company? How
American Law Can Recognize a Third Social Parent in Same-Sex Headed Families, 19
HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 171 (2008); R. Alta Charo, And Baby Makes Three - Or Four,
Or Five, Or Six: Redefining the Family After the Reprotech Revolution, 15 WIS.
WOMEN'S L.J. 231 (2000); Melanie B. Jacobs, Why Just Two? Disaggregating
Traditional Parental Rights and Responsibilities to Recognize Multiple Parents, 9 J.L.
& FAM. STUD. 309 (2007); David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition:
Tensions Between Legal, Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. J.
COMP. L. 125, 126 (2006) [hereinafter Meyer, Parenthood] ("Proposals to expand the
numerical boundaries of parenthood, so that a child might have at once three, four, or
even more parents, now carry the imprimatur of the United States' most influential
law-reform organization."); Brian H. Bix, The Bogeyman of Three (or More) Parents
(Minn. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-22, Aug. 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1196562. It is worth noting that
scholars that advocate for allowing more than two legal parents advocate for a process
whereby legal rights in third-parties would be determined by a court after the child is
born. Presumably, that is, after the child's first two legal parents are determined.
See, e.g., Melanie Jacobs, My Two Dads: Disaggregating Biological and Social
Paternity, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 809 (2006).
146. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.54 (West 2007); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
160.201 (Vernon 2007).
147. Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to
the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 912 (2000) (explaining
that "[b]ecause pregnancy and birth are relatively public and undisputed, the law has
rarely confronted the question of legal motherhood at all").
148. Id. at 883 (describing the marital presumption as the "primary rule governing
the parentage of children born to a married woman").
149. Carbone & Cahn, supra note 4, at 1050 (explaining that the marital
presumption emerged when genetic ties to fathers were not provable). As early as
1777, with the articulation of Lord Mansfield's Rule, the marital presumption was
difficult to rebut. The rule required proof that the husband did not have access to his
wife at any point during the time of possible conception. Typically, the only rebuttal to
the marital presumption was that the husband was beyond "the four seas" during the
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of additional presumptions that allowed genetic fathers of non-
marital children to gain legal parentage status.150 These
presumptions, like the marital presumption, were meant to grant
legal paternity to the genetic father of the child. 151 Thus, throughout
history, every state has awarded parental status to the genetic
mother and father of children conceived through sexual
reproduction. 152
Under parens patriae, the State acts as the child's agent and
must do for the child what she cannot do for herself - that is, choose
the person most likely to care for her and protect her rights
throughout her minority. Therefore, a state should guarantee a
child's fundamental right to legal parents at birth by designating the
genetic parents of children conceived through sexual reproduction as
the legal parents.153
time when conception could have occurred and, therefore, could not be the genetic
father. See Goodright v. Moss, (1777) 98 Eng. Rep. 1257, 1258 (K.B.); see also Meyer,
Parenthood, supra note 145, at 127 (describing the presumption as strong and only
overcome if the husband and wife were apart during the likely period of conception).
150. The 1973 Uniform Parentage Act presumes paternity in five relationship-
based circumstances: (1) the child is born during the man's marriage to the natural
mother; (2) before the child is born, the man and the natural mother attempt to marry,
but the marriage is declared invalid; (3) the man and the child's natural mother marry
or attempt to marry after the child's birth; (4) while the child is under the age of
majority, "the man receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as
his natural child"; and (5) the man acknowledges his paternity in writing, promptly
informs the natural mother, and she does not dispute his acknowledgement within a
reasonable time after notification. UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT §§ 4(a)(1)-(5) (1973).
151. Although none of the presumptions state that the man seeking legal paternity
must be the genetic father, they are all founded on the premise that the only person
willing to meet the requirements of the presumptions would be the genetic father. See
Meyer, Parenthood, supra note 145, at 130 (concluding that through its set of
presumptions, the Uniform Parentage Act attempts to identify the man who is the
genetic father of the child, which is consistent with the intention of the traditional
common law marital presumption).
152. Although some commentators have questioned the overriding role of genetics
in determining legal parentage, a genetic relationship remains a powerful indicator of
whether an adult is likely to act in a child's best interests throughout her minority.
MARY LYNDON SHANLEY, MAKING BABIES, MAKING FAMILIES: WHAT MATTERS MOST IN
AN AGE OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, SURROGACY, ADOPTION, AND SAME-SEX AND
UNWED PARENTS 63 (2001) (stating that "since biological parents have a variety of
incentives to care for their children to the best of their ability, assigning custody to
them tends to protect children's interests"); Marjorie Shultz, Reproductive Technology
and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L.
REV. 297, 319 (1990) (stating "legal assignment of parental status has, typically drawn
legitimacy from its reflection of and alignment with biological givens"); see also Appell,
supra note 132, at 685-86 (defending a system that bases legal parentage, at least in
part, on genetic relationship).
153. To be clear, this is not merely a "presumption" in favor of genetic parents
similar to the presumption found in the current system. The requirement that the
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To the extent that current parentage statutes allow persons
other than the genetic parents to gain the status of legal parents at
birth, they are unconstitutional. 154 With regards to legal maternity,
states can continue to use birth as proof of a genetic relationship
between the woman and the child. When a child is conceived
through sexual reproduction, the birth mother is without a doubt the
genetic mother and should be designated the legal mother.'55 As for
determining legal paternity, while current presumptions seek to
determine genetic paternity, they often fail to do so. Today, genetic
testing provides an accurate and final determination of a genetic
relationship between a man and child. Therefore, as will be argued
infra, the State must require proof of a genetic relationship through
DNA testing before awarding legal paternity.
2. The End of the Marital Presumption
As stated supra, parentage presumptions - including the marital
presumption - are unconstitutional because they introduce
uncertainty into parentage determinations, thus violating a child's
fundamental right to legal parents at birth. We also argued supra
that states must designate the genetic parents of children conceived
through sexual reproduction as the legal parents. Although these
two arguments are sufficient to find the marital presumption
unconstitutional, due to its history and widespread use, we address it
again to also demonstrate that the social goals of the marital
presumption no longer advance the child's best interests. 156
State designate the genetic parents as the legal parents is a definitive determination
that is based on the reasoned prediction that the genetic parents will act in the child's
best interest. In contrast, currently-used presumptions create a variety of ways for the
State to infer who is a genetic parent.
154. We are not suggesting that in each and every case genetic parents will act in
their child's best interests. We are merely arguing that the child has a fundamental
right to legal parents at birth and the genetic parents may reasonably be assumed to
act in their child's best interest the vast majority of the time. Determinations of
parentage at birth must be based on a prediction of future actions - specifically those
of the genetic parents. If a genetic parent fails to act in the best interest of the child,
or if another adult would also, or more likely act, in the child's best interest, our
argument in no way prohibits states from making such legal determinations after the
child is born.
155. When a child is conceived through sexual reproduction, assigning a legal
mother to a child at birth is a relatively clear proposition. The act of childbirth itself
leaves little dispute as to who is the genetic mother of the child. See Nguyen v. INS,
533 U.S. 53, 62 (2001) (stating that when determining parentage of the mother, "the
relation is verifiable from the birth itself'); Meyer, Parenthood, supra note 145, at 127
(noting that assignment of parental status to mothers "was typically a straightforward
matter and legal motherhood followed childbirth as a matter of course").
156. Theresa Glennon, Somebody's Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital
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The marital presumption initially served to protect the husband
and his family from the specter of infidelity and social disapproval.157
In addition, the marital presumption protected the child from the
stigma of illegitimacy. At the time the marital presumption was
codified, children of married parents earned significant social and
financial benefits, whereas non-marital children suffered severe
hardships.158 Therefore, to the extent the marital presumption
protected the family unit by maintaining the image of marital fidelity
- even when such harmony did not exist with the family - it served
the child's best interests. 159 Even today, the benefits to children who
are raised in a household consisting of two married parents are well-
documented. It is not at all clear, however, that the marital
presumption correlates to or causes that positive outcome. 16 0 Rather,
there is reason to conclude that the marital presumption harms
children.161
Presumption of Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 547, 587 (2000) (discussing historical
importance of the marital presumption).
157. See id. at 563 (stating that the marital presumption was not based on the best
interests of the child "but on society's need for stability and certainty in family
relationships at a time when property, and therefore often a family's livelihood, was
dependent on clear rules concerning patrilineal succession").
158. See MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 85-87
(1994).
159. Blackstone perceived the goals of the marital presumption as focusing on the
child's needs when he stated: "Mhe main end and design of marriage [is] to ascertain
and fix upon some certain person to whom the care, the protection, the maintenance,
and the education of the children should belong." WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1
COMMENTARIES 455 (1765). In 1824, Justice Story wrote: "As to the question of the
right of the father to have the custody of his infant child, in a general sense it is true.
But this is not on account of any absolute right of the father, but for the benefit of the
infant, the law presuming it to be for his interest to be under the nurture and care of
his natural protector, both for maintenance and education." United States v. Green,
26 F. Cas. 30, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1824).
160. See Carbone & Cahn, supra note 4, at 1066 (noting that "[gliven the
impermanence of marriage and the relative ease of genetic testing, relationships based
on falsehood are unlikely to last").
The rationale for the [marital] presumption, judges explain, is that public
policy opposes bastardization of a child and protects the integrity of the
marital family. With the Supreme Court's erosion of distinctions between
legitimate and illegitimate children, however, these old public policy
arguments, which formerly cushioned the child against loss of her functional
family relationships, are losing their vitality.
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on
Parents' Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1791 (1993) (citing Justice Brennan's
dissent in Michael H. questioning the utility of examining "tradition ... in a world in
which ... the fact of illegitimacy no longer plays the burdensome and stigmatizing role
it once did").
161. See, e.g., ROTHSTEIN, supra note 138, at 143; see also Michael H., 491 U.S. at
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Today, more than 50 percent of marriages fail, suggesting that
the marital presumption no longer serves as a social balm to an
ailing marriage.162 Pregnancy outside of marriage, divorce, and
adultery are common occurrences and, arguably, socially accepted.
This reality calls into serious doubt the long-term benefits of forming
a legal relationship between a child and a man who is not her genetic
father. If the mother and her husband have a 50 percent chance of
ending their relationship before the child turns eighteen, it is
questionable whether creating a legal relationship between the child
and her mother's husband is in the child's best interests.163
It is our contention that the marital presumption, when applied
today, protects husbands from social embarrassment, prevents wives
from having to disclose an extramarital affair, and serves the State's
interest in propping up the two-married-parents household as the
social norm. The marital presumption, however, is not in the child's
best interest and does not guarantee the child's fundamental right to
legal parents at birth.164 Today, a child does not need a father to
protect her from the stigma of illegitimacy at birth. Rather, children
need paternal support and nurturing throughout their eighteen years
of minority and beyond.
The benefits of determining genetic paternity at birth - rather
than relying on a presumption in favor of the mother's husband -
outweigh the potential conflicts that may arise in the few marriages
forced to confront a woman's infidelity just as a newborn child enters
the world. Eliminating the marital presumption will create a legal
relationship between the child and the man who will always be her
genetic father. Furthermore, clearing up doubts as to paternity at
birth will prevent later attempts to disclaim paternity.165 Finally,
115 (noting that before Michael H. reached the Court, and despite the Court's eventual
holding to the contrary, a California court-appointed psychologist recommended that
Michael be allowed continued contact with Victoria).
162. BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, AND DEATHS: PROVISIONAL DATA FOR 2003, 52
NAT'L VITAL STAT. REP. No. 22, at 1 (2004), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr52/
nvsr52_22.pdf; see also Carbone & Cahn, supra note 3, at 1066-67 (noting that one of
every two marriages fails and over half of modern American children spend some part
of their childhood in a family headed by a single parent).
163. See, e.g., Larry Bumpass, Children and Marital Disruption: A Replication and
Update, 21 DEMOGRAPHY 71-82 (1984).
164. See Carbone & Cahn, supra note 4, at 1012 (arguing that the marital
presumption can "prevent the child from establishing a relationship with an adult who
is committed to her and not just her mother").
165. The seriousness of this issue is demonstrated by the fact that many states and
the ALI's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution find it necessary to allow
husbands to rebut the marital presumption only for a limited period of time, after
which - even if it is shown that he is not the genetic father - courts are unable to
revoke his status and the accompanying duties and obligations as the legal father. See
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such clarity may result in greater commitment from the father.166
These arguments make it difficult to accept that a parent-child
relationship that is based on a legal fiction is in the child's best
interests. 167
3. DNA Testing
To avoid the legal fiction created by paternity presumptions and
guarantee the fundamental right to legal parents at birth, states
must recognize the genetic father of children conceived through
sexual reproduction as a legal parent. Although the current
parentage system seeks to grant legal parentage to the genetic
fathers of such children, the system relies on a series of
presumptions to decide whether certain people are the genetic
parents. Using these unreliable and rebuttable presumptions is no
longer necessary. Today, inexpensive genetic tests can establish a
genetic relationship with an accuracy rate of 99 percent.168 Genetic
testing should take place at, or as close as possible to, the child's
birth. Although such testing may sound invasive, in reality it is not
that demanding and is relatively easy to implement.
The birth of a child is a significant moment in a father's life and
is an event many fathers refuse to miss.169 As a result, six in seven
paternity acknowledgments occur voluntarily at the hospital when
the child is born.170 Since so many men are present at this
momentous event and willing to immediately acknowledge their
paternity, a simple genetic test could easily be administered at the
hospital. An inexpensive blood test would take just minutes and
Meyer, Parenthood, supra note 145, at 137-38.
166. See, e.g., id. at 137 (recognizing "recent scholarship in the field of evolutionary
biology suggesting that parents may tend to invest more in the care of their own
genetic offspring").
167. See also Carbone & Cahn, supra note 4, at 1067 (stating that "[flathers are
more likely to remain committed to their children if they are either certain of
paternity, or they have, with or without the formality of adoption, knowingly accepted
responsibility for someone else's child").
168. See Nancy E. Dowd, Parentage at Birth: Birthfathers and Social Fatherhood,
14 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 909, 911-12 (2006); see also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491
U.S. 110, 161 (1989) (White, J., dissenting) (stating that "we have now clearly
recognized the use of blood tests as an authoritative means of evaluating allegations of
paternity").
169. See Dowd, supra note 168, at 919. Men take on a "paternal identity" when
they recognize their biological fatherhood, and the birth of their child is a critical
moment in creating a bond between father and child. WILLIAM MARSIGLIO,
PROCREATIVE MAN 6-7 (Tim Bartlett ed., 1998).
170. See Dowd, supra note 168, at 919-20 (discussing paternity establishment for
non-marital children).
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would establish paternity immediately.171 Social science suggests
that a man's process of mentally assuming the role of a father is
comprised of ritualistic and ceremonious acts.172 In that respect, the
introduction of a blood test to solidify paternity may further
strengthen the father-child bond by creating a clear and definite
ritual for each father at the birth of his child. 173
The State infringes upon a child's fundamental right to legal
parents at birth when it grants paternity rights based on outdated
and inaccurate presumptions. The birth mother's husband or
partner is not necessarily the most likely person to care for and
protect the child throughout her minority. Instead, the genetic
father is most likely to fulfill this role. Certainly, in the majority of
cases the birth mother's husband or partner is the child's genetic
father. He will be the legal father in accordance with the child's
rights and the adults' expectations. In cases when the husband or
partner is not the genetic father, however, the State's obligation to
the child requires that it designate the genetic father as the child's
legal father.
C. Children Conceived Through Assisted Reproductive
Technology
Children conceived through ART also have a fundamental right
to legal parents at birth that must be fulfilled by a clear, definitive,
self-executing statute. Few states, however, provide such statutes
for ART children. Accordingly, the vast majority of states must make
two changes to their parentage statutes in order to guarantee the
fundamental right to legal parents at birth to children conceived
through ART. First, each state must adopt statutory provisions that
provide legal parents for ART children. Second, those statutory
provisions must identify the intended parents as the legal parents of
children conceived through ART.
171. See generally American Pregnancy Association, Paternity Testing,
http://www.american pregnancy.org/prenataltesting/paternitytesting.html (last visited
Mar. 4, 2010).
172. These rituals include things like cutting the umbilical cord, holding his child
for the first time, counting fingers and toes, signing a birth certificate, even handing
out cigars to co-workers. See RICHARD K. REED, BIRTHING FATHERS 12-21 (2005).
173. Of course, if the genetic father is found to be unfit, there are legal mechanisms
through which his parental rights can be terminated. If a genetic father is unknown
or cannot be located, mechanisms also exist for another man to be granted legal rights
to the child. "By providing certainty when a child is born, a mandatory paternity or
second-parent determination precludes subsequent denials of responsibility for a
child. It does not necessarily, however, preclude subsequent terminations of
responsibility once another person is willing to assume responsibility." Carbone &
Cahn, supra note 4, at 1069.
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1. Comprehensive ART Parentage Statutes
States must make clear parentage determinations at birth for all
children, including those conceived through ART. Up to five parties
may be involved in the conception of a child through ART and
uncertainty regarding legal parentage often leads to lengthy
litigation.174 Any delay in determining parentage due to the lack of
an applicable parentage statute violates a child's fundamental right
to legal parents at birth.
Currently, however, inclusion of ART children in state parentage
statutes is grossly inadequate.175 Even the 2000 Uniform Parentage
Act, which includes provisions for children conceived through ART,
fails to provide legal parents for all ART children. 176 Although many
parentage statutes include provisions pertaining to children
conceived through alternative insemination, these statutes only
apply in narrow circumstances.177 As a result, these statutes provide
legal parents to only some children conceived through alternative
insemination. Even fewer states provide statutory mechanisms to
determine legal parentage of children born to gestational carriers,178
and some states prohibit gestational carrier agreements
174. For instance, a gestational carrier may agree to gestate a child for two
intended parents and the gametes used to conceive the child may be procured from
sperm and egg donors. See, e.g., In re Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1998).
175. See Kira Horstmeyer, Note, Putting Your Eggs in Someone Else's Basket:
Inserting Uniformity into the Uniform Parentage Act's Treatment of Assisted
Reproduction, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 671, 684-91 (2007) (identifying the different
approaches each state has taken in regards to assisted reproduction by categorizing
each state's statutes regarding assisted reproduction, and lack thereof).
176. Mary Patricia Byrn, From Right to Wrong: A Critique of the 2000 Uniform
Parentage Act, 16 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 163, 173-77 (2007).
177. Although about two-thirds of states have parentage statutes determining
parentage of children conceived through alternative insemination, most of these
provisions are very narrow and fail to provide legal parents to all children conceived
through alternative insemination. See Horstmeyer, supra note 176, at 690. For
example, the Minnesota statute dealing with artificial insemination creates paternity
under only specific circumstances: "If, under the supervision of a licensed physician
and with the consent of her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen
donated by a man not her husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the
biological father of a child thereby conceived. The husband's consent must be in
writing and signed by him and his wife. The consent must be retained by the physician
for at least four years after the confirmation of a pregnancy that occurs during the
process of artificial insemination." MINN. STAT. § 257.56 (2010).
178. See Darra L. Hofman, "Mama's Baby, Daddy's Maybe:" A State-by-State Survey
of Surrogacy Laws and Their Disparate Gender Impact, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 449,
454-60 (2009) (discussing the differences in surrogacy laws from state to state). It is
worth noting that only thirteen states have explicit statutory language regarding
gestational carriers. Id.
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altogether.179 It is beyond the scope of this Article to take issue with
states' efforts to discourage surrogacy. We argue, however, that
states are obligated to provide all children legal parents at birth,
including those born to gestational carriers. 180
When ART children are born in states without adequate
parentage statutes, a variety of outcomes may result. In some cases,
the child will have one legal parent - the birth mother. In the case
of surrogacy, however, the birth/legal mother has no intention of
raising the child. If the gestational carrier is married, the child will
have a legal mother and a legal father at birth - based on the
marital presumption - but, again, neither of those legal parents
intends to raise the child. In cases where conception occurred
through alternative insemination, the birth/legal mother is likely to
be the person who intends to raise the child, but her partner is often
denied any legal relationship with the child due to the non-existence
of an applicable parentage statute. As a result, the child's primary
intimate, familial relationships are not legally recognized and the
child's ability to form and maintain the parent-child relationship is
at risk. Furthermore, the wrong adults - or no adults - have the
duty and obligation to act in the child's best interests. Therefore, any
state parentage statute that fails to provide legal parents for all
children at birth - including those conceived through ART - does
not guarantee a child's fundamental right to legal parents at birth
and is unconstitutional.
2. Why Intended Parents?
Not only must states adopt parentage statutes that provide legal
parents for ART children, those statutes must designate the intended
parents as the legal parents. When a child is conceived through
ART, one or both of the persons who intend to raise the child may not
be genetically related to the child. Indeed, intended parents often
179. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 722.851-.861 (2010) (identifying "surrogate
parentage contracts ... as contrary to public policy"); see also Hofman, supra note 179,
at 454-60.
180. The Court has held on several instances that a state cannot punish a child
based upon disapproval of the actions or status of the child's parents. See Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982) (stating "[e]ven if the State found it expedient to control
the conduct of adults by acting against their children, legislation directing the onus of
a parent's misconduct against his children does not comport with fundamental
conceptions of justice"); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (invalidating a
section of the Social Security Act that prohibited some non-marital children from
receiving benefits); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175-76 (1972)
("Courts are powerless to prevent the social opprobrium suffered by these hapless
children, but the Equal Protection Clause does enable us to strike down discriminatory
laws relating to status of birth.").
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use anonymously donated gametes with the desire that the identity
of one or both of the genetic parents never be known.181 The intended
parents, however, are the persons who desired to have the child, used
ART to conceive the child, and plan to care for and protect the
child.182 The intended persons, therefore, are most likely to act in the
child's best interests. It is with these persons that the child would
most likely desire to form an intimate, familial relationship and,
therefore, would likely choose as her legal parents if she could
exercise the fundamental right to legal parents at birth on her own
behalf.
States, therefore, fulfill their role as parens patriae by adopting
parentage statutes that recognize the constitutionally-protected
relationship between ART children and their intended parents. For
children conceived through sexual reproduction, state parentage
statutes must designate the genetic parents as the child's legal
parents. By adopting parentage statutes that assign children
parents from these respective groups, states ensure that every child's
fundamental right to legal parents at birth is guaranteed from the
moment they are born.
VI. CONCLUSION
Under the law, there can be no doubt that the child comes first
and legal parents come second.183 At the moment a child is born, she
is a juridical person fully endowed with constitutional rights. In
contrast, a child's parents do not become legal parents until a state
statute grants them that status. 184 The State, therefore, exercises an
enormous amount of power when it drafts the parentage statutes
that designate who becomes a legal parent. The State's historic
parens patriae power obligates it to protect and guarantee the
constitutional rights of those persons, especially children, Who are
incapable of exercising their constitutional rights on their own.185
Therefore, when a State drafts the parentage statutes that create
181. As a result, while a genetic relationship is the best predictor of a long-term
relationship between a parent and child when the child is conceived through sexual
reproduction, genetic connections are less relevant when children are conceived
through ART. Lori B. Andrews, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Challenge
for Paternity Laws, in GENETIC TIES AND THE FAMILY 186, 198 (Mark L. Rothstein et
al. eds., 2005) (noting that ART has caused states to rely less on genetics and more on
the intent of the parties when determining the legal parents of ART children).
182. Lawrence, supra note 138, at 414 (stating "[tihe intended parents are, so to
speak, the 'first cause' of the procreative relationship; they are the ones who have
engineered the birth of the child").
183. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
184. See supra text accompanying note 10.
185. See supra notes 97-98.
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legal parent-child relationships, it is obligated under parens patriae
to ensure that those statutes guarantee the child's constitutional
rights. In other words, when drafting the statutes that will
determine who a child's legal parents will be, the State's foremost
consideration must be the child's constitutional rights.
The most important right that the State must consider when
drafting its parentage statutes is the child's fundamental right to
legal parents at birth. The fundamental right to legal parents at
birth derives from the substantive due process privacy right to form
intimate, familial relationships, as well as the right to intimate
association. This right ensures that a child may develop the parent-
child relationships necessary to preserve her liberty and protect her
rights. Under its parens patraie power, the State must ensure that
its parentage statutes satisfy this right.
In order to guarantee the child's fundamental right to legal
parents at birth, states must reform their current parentage statutes
in three ways. First, states must replace all presumptions in
parentage statutes with clear determinations that definitively decide
a child's legal parents at birth. Second, states must grant legal
parentage to children conceived through sexual reproduction to the
child's genetic parents, since they are the persons most likely to act
in the child's best interests. Third, states must grant legal parentage
to children conceived through assisted reproductive technology to the
intended parents, who are also the persons most likely to act in the
child's best interests. By adopting statutes that assign children
parents from these respective groups, states guarantee every child's
fundamental right to legal parents at birth.
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